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 TRUST (AND SOCIAL CAPITAL) IN CULTURAL THEORY 
 
 
In the 1990s, the study of social capital and trust captured some of the theoretical high-ground 
in social and political science, on the wings of the success of Robert Putnam’s book Making 
Democracy Work. These writings have served to remind us of the widespread need to 
overcome and avoid a dire set of social conditions: those under which people find it very hard 
to cooperate and trust each other. When people see no reason at all to put trust and effort into 
collective enterprises, then it is unlikely that democracies can flourish, economies grow, 
environments survive, development aid function, and the rule of law reign. 
In this article, I trace the contributions that the cultural theory developed by Mary 
Douglas, Michael Thompson, Aaron Wildavsky and others can make to the debate on social 
capital. First, I sketch the various revisions of Putnam’s social capital-thesis that have been 
proposed since the publication of Making Democracy Work. I note that these revisions are 
illuminating in and of themselves, yet do not constitute a full-fledged theory of the dynamic 
processes through which trust and cooperation between people can flourish or flounder. 
Thereafter, I argue that the cultural analysis of Douglas and co. is compatible with the 
revisions that have been advocated, while also offering an interesting and policy-relevant 
account of how people can collectively slide into, and emerge from, social relations that are 
incapacitated by very low levels of trust and cooperation. 
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The Social Capital Thesis 
 
As originally formulated in the first half of the 1990s, the study of social capital (Coleman 
1990: 300-21; Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Taylor 1996) held that collective action will 
not take place if the persons involved do not trust the other participants to put in their share of 
the work. It offered lack of trust between people as a major explanation for why collective 
actions that would benefit all are at times not undertaken. According to this view, only groups 
of people endowed with enough “social capital” (made up of norms, networks and mutual 
trust) are able to escape this perennial social dilemma. Furthermore, in particular the work of 
Putnam offered a view of how norms, networks and trust combine to produce collective 
action. He argued that the social norms, and trust in other people, that enable collective action 
are learned through participation in “intermediary” organizations, i.e., voluntary associations 
of citizens that are larger than families and clans, but smaller than nations or states. Examples 
are sport clubs, local religious organizations, and choral choirs. He maintained that the 
sociability and trust learned in such organizations spill over into other arenas, thereby raising 
the general civility of life in for instance the legal, political and economic domains. 
Empirical evidence has suggested that social capital can explain the presence, or 
absence, of economic growth (Helliwell and Putnam 1995; Burt 1997; Whiteley 2000), 
human well-being (Helliwell and Putnam 2004); low crime rates (Rubio 1997; Winkel and 
Saegert 1998), healthy populations (Kawachi, Kennedy and Lochner 1997; Veenstra 2001; 
Hendryx, Ahern, Lovrich and McCurdy 2002), entrepreneurship and innovation (Svendsen 
and Svendsen 2005), environmental protection (Pretty and Ward 2001), as well as satisfactory 
democratic policies and procedures (Badescu and Uslaner 2003; Putnam 1993; 2002; 
Inglehart 1999). Much effort has therefore gone into monitoring whether social capital within 
particular countries has been in decline as of late (e.g., Hall 1999; de Hart and Dekker 1999; 
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Cusack 1999; Putnam 2000; Costa and Kahn 2001; Stolle and Hooghe 2005), as it is 
suspected that such a fall could be the harbinger of hard times. 
 
Revisions and Refinements 
 
The proposition that within civil society the trust and social norms are bred without which 
democracies would not function, nor economies prosper, has received a lot of scholarly 
attention. At least four sets of revisions and refinements have been advocated. A first set of 
revisions has concerned the direction of the causal arrows of the original social capital-
proposition: 
massive participation in voluntary associations —> trust between people, as well as 
social norms favoring cooperation —> well-functioning democratic polities and 
economies. 
 
Many have argued that the reverse causality also holds. In their view, social capital (in the 
form of mutual trust, social norms and networks) will only accumulate, and civil society 
thrive, if the right public policies are followed (Tarrow 1996; Paraskevopoulos 1998; Cohen 
1999; Warren 1999; Harriss 2002; Edwards, Foley and Diani 2001; Encarnacion 2003), and if 
the appropriate democratic institutions are in place (Barber 1983; J. Braithwaite 1998; Knack 
and Keefer 1997; Maloney, Smith and Stoker 2000). The public policies that have been 
advocated are inclusive ones: civic groups flourish when the governments involved are felt to 
take their concerns seriously and are perceived to treat these associations in a supportive and 
fair manner. Piotr Sztompka (1999: 26-27) has summed up the political institutions that 
appear to make democracy and interpersonal trust blossom: legitimacy, periodic elections and 
terms of office, division of powers, checks and balances and limited competence of 
institutions, rule of law and independent courts, constitutionalism and judicial review, due 
process, civic rights, law enforcement and open communication. 
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 A second set of proposed revisions questions the strength and validity of the causal 
links that make up the social capital-thesis. Why assume that the trust and collaborative norms 
that can be learned within civic groups are so easily extended to outsiders? The formation of 
groups often involves the carving of sharp boundaries and the nursing of distinct identities. 
What, therefore, stops group members from joining forces in an effort to further their own 
particularistic ends – at the expense of other people? Indeed, it may be plausible to assume 
that the formation of trust and cooperation within civic associations may have malign, rather 
than benign, effects on the common good (Levi 1996; Rubbio 1997; Portes 1998; Quibria 
2004). Bonds of trust and cooperation forged in civic groups cannot be expected to magically 
spread trust between members and non-members of these associations as well. And, arguably, 
it is precisely this latter kind of trust, i.e. trust among strangers, which makes complex 
societies (such as democracies and advanced economies) tick (Luhman 1973; Arrow 1974; 
Misztal 1996). 
One specification of this argument is that “horizontal” social capital (trust and norms 
generated among equals in citizens’ associations) may not necessarily bring forth “vertical” 
social capital (trust between, and cooperation among, governments and citizens). Many have 
argued that the latter brand of social capital is as important as the former, and that only the 
integration of both kinds of social capital ushers in democracy and prosperity (Evans 1996; 
Grootaert 1998; Woolcock 1998; Cusack 1999; Knack 1999). Another specification consists 
of Pierre Bourdieu’s usage of the term social capital. In Bourdieu’s view (1980), a person’s 
social capital depends on the nature of one’s social obligations, and the strengths of one’s 
networks and connections. Moreover, the members of the ruling social classes depend on their 
social (and other forms of) capital to perpetuate their dominant position at the expense of less-
connected groups in society. Hence, at least according to Bourdieu, social capital is just 
another tool of class domination and exploitation, and certainly not a common good. Several 
authors (Siisiäien 2000; Li, Pickles and Savage 2003) have argued that this particular take on 
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social capital (which predates Putnam’s and Coleman’s conceptualizations) is a more 
appropriate one. It follows from these various considerations that if the trust that supposedly 
oozes out of civil society is not a panacea for good government, then a healthy dose of 
distrust may be imperative for the proper functioning of democracy (Shapiro 1987; Levi 
1996; Hardin 1998). This line of thought leads us back to the conclusion of the first set of 
refinements discussed above, as distrust can be institutionalized by building all kinds of 
checks and balances into a polity: transparent public decision-making procedures, rule of law, 
parliamentary oversight, freedom of press, etc. 
 A further set of advocated changes to Putnam’s thesis zooms in on the second element 
in the causal chain of the social capital-thesis: interpersonal trust. This argument holds that 
there is no single way in which people confer their trust upon others. Instead, people have 
various ways of trusting and collaborating, something which the original social capital-thesis 
overlooks. The authors who have made this point have usually distinguished between two 
types of trust or social capital. Interestingly, the dichotomies that have been proposed sail 
under different flags, but often carry the same meaning. The first kind of trust that has been 
highlighted is rather limited in scope: person A will only trust person B to undertake action X 
if A has ample reason to assume that B will keep his or her part of the deal. A’s informed 
guess can have different sources, including the probability that B will get caught in an act of 
wrongdoing; the legal, social and financial penalties that can be imposed on B for a breach of 
trust; the costs to A of seeking recrimination; the trustworthiness of B in the past, and so on. 
This kind of trust under-girds atomistic, individualistic social relations in which people must 
always be weary of traps set by self-centered others. Valerie Braithwaite (1998) calls this 
“exchange trust”, while Tom Tyler and Roderick Kramer (1996) speak of “instrumental 
trust”. Russell Hardin (1993) dubs this “trust-as-encapsulated-interest” and argues that 
“rational” people cannot display any other kind of trust. Oliver Williamson (1993) names this 
phenomenon “calculativeness”, and posits that this is no trust at all. 
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The other form of trust that has been highlighted is interwoven with shared identities. 
It grows among those who feel part of the same community, such as a nation or ethnic group, 
region or social class. The conferring of this kind of trust is much more based on the desire to 
feel part of a community than on an all-out drive to reduce the chances that one is being 
played for a fool. Extending this second type of trust reinforces group ties and reaffirms that 
the trust-giver is a signed-up member of the community. When this form of trust is offered, it 
will usually not be restricted to a single act by a lone individual or organization. Rather, it 
typically covers a variety of actions by those who are perceived to be members of the 
community involved. And this is also the drawback: this type of trust is usually given to 
insiders, not to outsiders. Valerie Braithwaite (1998), as well as Tom Tyler and Roderick 
Kramer (1996) have named this form of trust, “communal” and “relational” trust, 
respectively. Those who have distinguished between alternative types of trust have asserted 
that different social domains and institutions rely more on one type of trust than on the other, 
and that different cultures are characterized by alternative combinations of forms of trust. 
Extending this line of argument, Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock (2002) have 
recently argued that the literature on social capital can be summarized by distinguishing 
between three types of social capital: bonding, bridging and linking. “Bonding” social capital 
stands for trusting, cooperative relations between members of a network who see themselves 
as being similar, as sharing a common identity. “Bridging” social capital is made up relations 
of respect and mutuality between people who feel that they are not alike in some socio-
demographic sense (such as age, ethnic group, class, etc). These two forms roughly (and 
respectively) correspond to the communal/relational and exchange/instrumental types of trust 
and social capital that I mentioned above. To these two types, Szreter and Woolcock add a 
third one, namely “linking” social capital, which connects people across power differentials. 
(In terms of the other distinction that I discussed earlier –the one between horizontal and 
vertical social capital– Szreter and Woolcock argue that horizontal social capital comes in 
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two packages, bridging and bonding, and vertical social capital in one version, namely 
linking). 
A last collection of revisions of Putnam’s social capital-hypothesis replaces the first 
factor in the causal link (participation in voluntary associations) with another one, namely 
shared norms of justice. It has been argued that a willingness to trust, and collaborate with, 
relative strangers is not so much the result of membership in civic associations, but is instead 
enabled by the institutionalization of widely shared moral perspectives, i.e., collective ideas 
about how social relations should be organized (Tyler and Kramer 1996; V. Braithwaite 1998; 
Offe 1999; Whiteley 1999). According to this view, people are willing to contribute to a 
collective enterprise when they feel that the enterprise is in accordance with their perceptions 
of how human relations should be structured. The validity of this view was confirmed in 
experimental research on different patterns of trust and cooperation within the United States 
and Japan undertaken by Nahoko Hayashi, Elinor Ostrom, James Walker and Toshio 
Yamagishi (1999). Their conclusion (p. 42) was that: 
the results of the present experiment demonstrate that it is differences in beliefs regarding the 
nature of social relations and of human nature, rather than differences in motivation to be 
altruistic or cooperative, that have a profound influence in the way people behave when 
facing interdependent social situations. 
 
A potentially large problem stares this brand of criticism in the face: within any region or 
social system, quite a few groups of people can be found with opposing moral perspectives. 
And each of these opposing moralities will offer alternative prescriptions for how political 
institutions and collective action should be organized. In that case, the question becomes: 
which of these alternatives should be followed? And if a single one of these alternatives is 
chosen, then how to motivate those people whose values conflict with this particular set of 
institutions? A possible answer to this question is that the existence of alternative moral 
perspectives should not be seen as the problem, but rather as the solution. According to this 
idea, collective action will especially blossom when it takes place against the background of a 
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constructive mix of alternative moralities and concomitant institutional patterns. In a 
perceptive contribution to the study of social capital, economist Partha Dasgupta (1999) has 
defended the notion that only hybrids of alternative institutional patterns facilitate widespread 
collective action. Kenneth Arrow (1999: 4) has supported this idea: 
instead of thinking of more and less [social interaction], it may be more fruitful to think of the 
existing social relations as a pre-existing network into which new parts of the economy (for 
example, development projects) have to be fitted. We would want to fit new projects so as to 
exploit complementarity relations and avoid rivalries. 
 
Szreter and Woolcock (2002: 25) have advocated a similar idea: 
A “healthy society”, capable of consistently promoting the population health of all its 
citizens, will be characterized by a balanced distribution of a relatively rich endowment of all 
three of [bonding, bridging, and linking] forms of social capital. In these circumstances it will 
be constituted by a vigorous, open and politically-conscious civic society of mutually 
respecting and highly varied (in terms of their social identities) citizens and their many 
associations in active dialogue and negotiation (there are certain to be conflicts requiring 
negotiation) with both their elected local government and their central state. 
 
The view that quite diverse ways of organizing and justifying social relations exist, and that 
only a balance between these different institutional forms enables collective action, has 
repeatedly appeared within social theory. For instance, it is a central plank in the pioneering 
work of Almond and Verba (1963) on civic culture. 
 The conceptual revisions of Putnam’s proposition have turned the study of social 
capital into a lively debate. Nonetheless, they have not added up to a full-fledged dynamic 
account of how to break vicious circles of massive distrust, lack of cooperation, destitution, 
corruption, and tyranny, and how to move towards greater democracy and a more effective 
alleviation of poverty (Harris and de Renzio 1997; Foley and Edwards 1999; Grote 1998). 
Alejandro Portes is rather pessimistic (1998: 22): 
..there is little ground to believe that social capital will provide a ready remedy for major 
social problems, as promised by its bolder proponents. Recent proclamations to that effect 
merely restate the original problems and have not been accompanied so far by any persuasive 
account of how to bring about the desired stocks of public civicness. 
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However, this lack of a dynamic and policy-relevant account of social capital may at least 
partly be overcome with the help of a novel theory of social and political life. 
 
The Theory of Socio-Cultural Viability 
 
During the last two decades, a new theoretical framework has emerged that is compatible with 
the latest insights in the study of social capital, while also providing a fresh perspective on 
how groups of people can slide into, and emerge from, widespread distrust and lack of 
collective action. This theory –labeled “the theory of socio-cultural viability,” or, for short, 
“cultural theory”– is based on the seminal ideas of anthropologist Mary Douglas (1978; 1982; 
1987; 1992), which have been clarified, systemized and extended by a group of 
anthropologists and political scientists (Wildavsky 1987; 1998; Thompson, Ellis and 
Wildavsky 1990; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Coyle and Ellis 1994; Adams 1995; 
Thompson 1996; Hood 1998; Thompson, Grendstad and Selle 1999). 
The original aim of this approach was to devise a typology of social forms that fit the 
classificatory schemes developed by the grand old social theorists (Durkheim, Marx, Weber, 
etc.), as well as the evidence collected in ethnographic studies. According to cultural theory, 
four primary ways of organizing, perceiving, and justifying social relations exist: 
egalitarianism, hierarchy, individualism and fatalism. It is postulated that these four “ways of 
life” are in conflict, as well as continuously wax and wane, in every conceivable domain of 
social life. As many social domains can be distinguished within and between societies, the 
theory allows one to perceive a wide and ever-changing cultural and social variety, while still 
enabling one to formulate general propositions. 
Each way of life consists of a specific way of structuring social relations and a 
supporting cast of particular perceptions, values, emotions, and interests. The fourfold 
typology is derived from two dimensions of sociality called “grid” and “group”. Grid 
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measures the extent to which ranking and stratification constrains the behavior of individuals. 
Group, by contrast, measures the extent to which an overriding commitment to a social unit 
constrains the thought and action of individuals. Assigning two values (high and low) to the 
two dimensions gives the four ways of organizing social relations. Egalitarianism is 
associated with a low-grid score (little stratification) and a high-group score (strong group 
boundaries and solidarity). The combination of a high score on the grid dimension (lots of 
stratification) with a high score on the group dimension (much solidarity) gives hierarchy. 
The third way of life, individualism, is associated with low scores on both the grid and group 
scales. Last, fatalism is characterized by a high-grid and a low-group score.1
These four ways of organizing tend to produce different ways of perceiving and 
justifying. In an egalitarian social setting, actors see nature as fragile, intricately 
interconnected and ephemeral, and man as essentially caring (until corrupted by coercive 
institutions such as markets and hierarchies). We must all tread lightly on the earth, and it is 
not enough that people start off equal; they must end up equal as well – equality of result. 
Trust and leveling go hand-in-hand, and institutions that distribute unequally are distrusted. 
Voluntary simplicity is the only solution to our economic, environmental and other problems, 
with the Precautionary Principle being strictly enforced on those who are tempted not to share 
the simple life. Egalitarianism also instills a preference for a participatory model of 
democracy. In this model there is no place for deference, nor support for indirect or 
majoritarian modes of decision-making. Democratic decisions should be agreed upon by all 
affected, ideally in a small-scale, face-to-face manner at the grassroots level. 
In a hierarchical social setting, actors see the world as controllable. Nature is stable 
until pushed beyond discoverable limits, and man is malleable: deeply flawed but redeemable 
by firm, long-lasting, and trustworthy institutions. Fair distribution is by rank and station or, 
in the modern context, by need (with the level of need being determined by expert and 
dispassionate authority). “Rational” resource management requires certified experts to 
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determine the precise locations of nature’s limits, and statutory regulation to ensure that all 
economic activity is kept within those limits. As only those with superior insight and virtue 
should make public decisions, democracy should be indirect, representative and majoritarian, 
with the political class being given primacy over public affairs on the basis of popular 
elections every few years. This political elite should act as trustees focused on the long-term 
general interest, and are not to be influenced by short-term individual or factional claims. 
In an individualistic social setting, actors view nature as benign and resilient –able to 
recover from any exploitation– and man as inherently self-seeking and atomistic. Trial and 
error, in self-organizing ego-focused networks (unfettered markets), is the way to go, with 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand ensuring that people only do well when others also benefit. The 
upholders of the individualistic way of life, in consequence, cooperate until others give them 
reason not to and then retaliate in kind (the winning “tit for tat” strategy in the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma game), and see it as only fair that (as in the joint stock company) those 
who put the most in get the most out. They think institutions that work with the grain of the 
market (that get rid of environmentally harmful subsidies, for instance) are what are needed. 
Individualism extols a protective model of democracy. According to this way of life, 
individual choice is sacrosanct. Democracies should enable individuals to carry out their own 
plans. The main raison d’être of government is the protection of individual rights, life, liberty 
and estate. To enable this, regular general elections are necessary, but not sufficient, as these 
processes tend towards crude majoritarianism, which can result in even large minorities being 
denied self-determination. Hence, the pressing need exists for checks and balances to protect 
individual and minority rights and interests. 
In a fatalistic social setting, finally, actors find neither rhyme nor reason in nature, and 
suppose that man is fickle and untrustworthy. Fairness is not to be found in this life, and there 
is no hope of effecting change for the better. ‘Defect first’ –the winning strategy in the one-
off prisoner’s dilemma– makes sense here, given the unreliability of communication and the 
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permanent absence of prior acts of good faith. Without the possibility of ever getting in sync 
with nature, or of building trust with others, the fatalistic world –unlike the three others– is 
one in which learning is impossible. ‘Why bother?’ therefore is the rational management 
response. Fatalism breeds a belief that democracy may be a good thing, but will not be 
established in this life. This way of organizing, justifying and perceiving social relations 
closely corresponds to Putnam’s (1993) depiction of regions with low social capital, as well 
as Banfield’s (1958) “amoral familism”, and Lewis’s (1968) “culture of poverty”. 
This fourfold classification of alternative ways of organizing and perceiving social 
relations has captured the contradictory ways in which people approach all kinds of public 
policy issues. Indeed, these alternative ways of organizing and perceiving, in varying 
strengths and patterns of pairwise alliance, are discernible almost anywhere you care to look – 
from debates over the wisdom of prescribing safety seat belts, via the different ways in which 
international regimes cope with transboundary risks such as water pollution, to the changing 
definition and treatment of the mentally ill by public authorities (e.g., Swedlow 1994; Adams 
1995; Verweij 2001). The theory does not assume policy domains to be static. Rather, it 
portrays such domains to be in constant flux, caused by the continuous waxing and waning, 
splitting and merging of alternative ways of life, as well as by the ceaseless, mutual criticisms 
exchanged between adherents to alternative ways of life which force all stakeholders to 
constantly update and revise their arguments and claims. 
Cultural theory has several normative implications. First, there is the realization that 
people are arguing from different premises and that, since these premises are anchored in 
alternative forms of organizing, they will never agree. Second, in line with the ‘argumentative 
turn’ in policy analysis (Morone and Woodhouse 1986; Collingridge 1992; Winner 1992), 
this contention, as well as being unavoidable, is all to the good: something to be harnessed 
through constructive communication. Each way of organizing and perceiving: (1) distils 
certain elements of experience and wisdom that are missed by the others; (2) provides a clear 
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expression of the way in which a significant portion of the populace feels we should live with 
one another and with nature; and (3) needs all the others in order to be sustainable.2 As Barry 
Schwartz (1991: 765) has put it: 
Each way of life undermines itself. Individualism would mean chaos without hierarchical 
authority to enforce contracts and repel enemies. To get work done and settle disputes the 
egalitarian order needs hierarchy, too. Hierarchies, in turn, would be stagnant without the 
creative energy of individualism, uncohesive without the binding force of equality, unstable 
without the passivity and acquiescence of fatalism. Dominant and subordinate ways of life 
thus exist in alliance yet this relationship is fragile, constantly shifting, constantly generating 
a societal environment conducive to change. 
 
According to cultural theory, the four ways of organizing, justifying and perceiving are 
present in any social domain. However, fatalism –i.e., social relations characterized by low 
levels of inter-personal trust and cooperation– will come to dominate the other ways of life, 
whenever extensive efforts are made to promote any single way of life at the expense of the 
others. If persistent attempts are made to re-organize social domains along purely 
hierarchical, individualistic, egalitarian or (less surprisingly) fatalistic lines, then an increase 
in fatalism will result. This is cultural theory’s explanation of how social capital is diminished 
within societies or specific social domains. Empirical examples taken from the literature 
would include the failed, and almost purely hierarchical, efforts to turn Nepal into a second 
Singapore with the help of massive levels of development aid and huge dams (Gyawali 2002); 
the much-lamented, and predominantly individualistic, attempts to create a competitive 
economy in Russia by administering a “shock therapy” of rapid privatisation (Intriligator, 
Wedel and Lee 2006); and the largely egalitarian Danish social housing policies of the 1990s 
that aimed (but did not achieve) to “empower” public housing-tenants (Jensen 1999). 
Inversely, fatalism will be reduced, and collective action and social capital will be allowed to 
flourish, when all the ways of life are carefully taken account of in the policy and governance 
processes that shape social domains. Real-life instances discussed in the literature include the 
urban development of Munich since 1945 (Hendriks 1999); the management of flood risks in 
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eastern Hungary (Bayer and Vári 2002); and the creative design of the Internet (Tranvik, 
Thompson and Selle 2000). 
 
Trust, Social Capital and Cultural Theory 
 
Cultural theory therefore presents an account of how societies can slide into, or emerge from, 
vicious circles of low trust and cooperation that is not primarily cast in terms of participation 
within civil society. Furthermore, I would argue that this account is compatible with the four 
major revisions of Putnam’s thesis that have been advocated during the last ten years and that 
I presented above. Compressed, these revisions entail that: (1) carefully crafted public 
policies, forged in open, deliberative democratic institutions, are important in creating social 
capital; (2) social capital does not only consist of patterns of trust, but also of patterns of 
distrust; (3) three different types of social capital abound, each of which is necessary for 
collective action to thrive; and (4) these different types social capital represent alternative 
moralities, which are rooted in different types of social relations. At face value, these four 
revisions seem a bit disjointed and unrelated. Interestingly, however, cultural theory combines 
all these features in its representation of how high levels of collective action can be 
maintained. 
 Cultural theory posits that sustainable collective action (and, therefore, a high level of 
social capital) requires maintaining a dynamic, ever-changing balance between four 
alternative ways of organizing, perceiving, and justifying social relations. From this, it 
immediately follows that the theory is in accordance with the fourth proposed revision, 
namely to seek for the causes of social capital among collectively held moralities that are 
rooted in alternative patterns of social organization. Individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism, 
and fatalism all encompass alternative views on what is (and is not) fair and just; views that 
stem from, and legitimize, distinct ways of organizing social relations. 
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In addition, it should be noted that cultural theory’s four ways of life encompass both 
patterns of trust and patterns of distrust. The one exception to this is fatalism, which is mainly 
characterized by high levels of various forms of distrust –of the willingness of people to 
cooperate, of the possibilities to improve one’s lot, of justice being carried out, etc.–, and low 
levels of any type of trust. But the other three ways of life all incorporate both patterns of trust 
and distrust. In an egalitarian setting, people put their trust in consensual, local decision-
making, closely-knit, small-scale communities, simplicity of life-style, as well as equality of 
condition, and they distrust any form of power inequality (including “big government” and 
“big business”), capitalism, and the wanton exploitation of natural resources. Hierarchy 
inspires people to put their confidence in wise and virtuous leaders, long-term, central 
planning, and social harmony and graciousness, while remaining highly suspicious of “the 
rule of the mob”, self-made, upstart leaders, an “unnatural” leveling of differences, and rash, 
bold actions undertaken without a care for the morrow. In an individualistic social setting, 
people tend to convey their trust upon checks and balances that maximize individual freedom, 
unambiguous rewards and punishments that appeal to Man’s more basic instincts, the 
willingness of people to cooperate (as long as that is to their advantage, and non-cooperation 
can be detected), nature’s resilience, the ability of individuals to overcome the odds through 
hard work and ingenuity, and whoever has managed to build up a reputation for being able to 
“deliver the goods” (regardless of age, education, gender or race), and they tend to be wary 
and distrustful of rigid, centrally imposed rules and regulations, people who claim to be more 
virtuous than others, and any concentration of power. It can therefore be concluded that 
cultural theory is also in agreement with the second revision that has been advocated in the 
study of social capital. In positing that high levels of social capital requires a (dynamic) 
balance between four ways of life (almost all of which include distinct patterns of both trust 
and distrust), the theory stipulates that the institutionalization of both trust and distrust is vital 
for the production of social capital. 
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Furthermore, cultural theory fulfills the requirements of the third proposed revision – 
to distinguish between bonding, bridging and linking forms of social capital. Two 
observations are important in this regard. First, in distinguishing between these three forms of 
social capital (and tying each of these to a different branch of the literature), Szreter and 
Woolcock provide a comprehensive overview of the current writings on social capital. 
Furthermore, the three forms of social capital that Szreter and Woolcock distill from the 
extant literature almost seamlessly overlap with three of the four ways of organizing, 
perceiving and justifying social relations that cultural theory sets out. Linking social capital, 
which is supposed to create trust between people across power differentials, is clearly the 
form of social capital that underpins, and is produced by, the hierarchical way of life. 
Bonding social capital, which connects people belonging to the same group, is the type of 
social capital that is most prevalent in the egalitarian way of organizing, justifying and 
perceiving social relations. And bridging social capital, which brings together individuals 
who are equal in terms of status and power but who do not feel that they share the same social 
identity (such as “ethnic traders seeking counterparts in overseas markets, ..or professionals 
exchanging business cards at international conferences” – Szreter and Woolcock 2002: 14) is 
produced in individualistic social settings. (And keep in mind that cultural theory’s remaining 
category –fatalism– closely corresponds to social situations in which there is very little social 
capital). Hence, cultural theory is in compliance with the requirements of the third refinement 
of the social capital-thesis that has been suggested. 
 Finally, cultural theory meets the conditions of the one remaining revision that has 
been called for, namely to recognize the importance of carefully crafted, deliberative public 
policies. This is precisely the governance ideal that has been advocated by cultural theorists 
(e.g., Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Hendriks 1999; Gyawali 2002). To foster the creative 
and adaptable mix of the four ways of life that is needed to sustain high levels of collective 
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action, they have recommended making use of open, consultative decision-making processes 
in which all four “voices” are heard and responded to. 
 
Conclusion: Why Trust in Cultural Theory? 
 
To argue that a theory is compatible with other approaches is of course not necessarily to 
establish that it is preferable to those other approaches: it may, for instance, merely be 
equivalent. For three reasons, I believe that cultural theory provides a more useful and 
satisfactory framework for studying the rise and fall of social capital than other approaches 
which have been on offer. 
 The first of these considerations concerns parsimony. Cultural theory offers a simple 
and elegant analysis of social capital that does the work that a variety of other theories, 
approaches and concepts can only do in tandem. As I have shown above, quite a number of 
revisions and refinements of Putnam’s social capital-thesis have been put forward during the 
last decade, but only the theory of socio-cultural viability incorporates all of these proposed 
changes into a single, systematic framework. That is the essence of the ideal of parsimony. 
 Second, cultural theory has been fleshed out to larger extent than other approaches in 
the study of social capital. Quite a few of the terms circulating in the social capital-literature –
such as horizontal social capital, or trust-as-encapsulated-interest– do not always have much 
conceptual meat attached to them. In contrast, cultural theory’s four ways of organizing, 
justifying and perceiving social relations are not only defined clearly, but also come with a 
long list of distinct predispositions that have been formulated a priori. The latter would 
include views of nature, views of human nature, risk attitudes, perceptions of time and space, 
governance ideals, technological preferences, ways of making ends meet, patterns of blame, 
information processes, aesthetic styles, etc. In other words, cultural theory represents a more 
elaborate conceptual framework than its competitors. 
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 Last, cultural theory appears to have more relevance to policy-making and 
governance. As the earlier quote from Alejandro Portes indicated, it is rather difficult to see 
how one could put into practice the injunction to produce more social capital, or to get people 
to trust each other more, or to motivate individuals to join voluntary associations. By 
comparison, cultural theory’s implications for sustaining, or reaching, high levels of 
collective action and social capital appear more straightforward and practical. This is the case, 
as the theory sets out which alternative perspectives typically abound in public debates about 
pressing social ills, and as it offers various reasons for why successful solutions to these ills 
must consist of flexible, creative combinations of all these perspectives. This then becomes 
the basis for its claim that decision-makers should proceed in a consultative, deliberative 
manner that carefully takes into consideration the arguments and proposals of the adherents to 
all ways of life. For most contemporary policy-makers, it should not be overly complicated to 
grasp this relatively simple idea, and (if they were so inclined) to put it into practice. 
 For these various reasons, I would like to conclude by asserting that more heed should 
be paid within the study of social capital to the cultural theory-literature. As four wrongs can 
make a right. 
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1 The theory of socio-cultural viability distinguishes a fifth way of life, usually called the way of the hermit.The 
way of the hermit represents not so much a way of organizing social relations, as a way of disassociating oneself 
from social relations. As a consequence, the hermit has usually been left out of policy studies based on cultural 
theory – a practice that I follow here for simplicity’s sake. 
2 With the exception of fatalism. While the other three forms of organizing need a minimum amount of fatalism, 
the reverse does not hold true. Fatalism, unlike the others, can feed on, and sustain, itself. 
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